The State of Utah v. George Albert Roybal : Brief of Respondent by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) 
1985 
The State of Utah v. George Albert Roybal : Brief of Respondent 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2 
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the 
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act, 
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.David L. Wilkinson and J. Stephen Mikita; Attorneys for 
Respondent 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Respondent, Utah v. Roybal, No. 19064 (1985). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4615 
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v- Case No. 19064 
GEORGE ALBERT ROYBAL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT AND CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED 
ASSAULT, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK, JUDGE, PRESIDING 
JAMES A. VALDEZ 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assn. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84601 
Attorney for Appellant 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
J. STEPHEN MIKITA 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1 r;n;MENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
, 11NSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
liWINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
OF THE CASE 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 







POINT I THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE ••••• 5 
RULER AND SUBSTITUTE KNIFE INTO EVIDENCE 
POINT II THE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S INTOXICATION •••• 11 
DID NOT NEGATE THE REQUIRED INTENT FOR 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT 
CONCLUSION ••••• • ••••••• 15 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
.c.AS..E..S 
Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, Utah, • 
645 P.2d 608 (1982) 
Gooden y. State, 617 P.2d 248 (Okla Crim. App. 1980) 
y. Safeway Stores. Inc., Utah, 565 P.2d 1139 
(1977) 
Eeo1Jle y. Rochia, 92 Cal. Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372 (1971) 
lliYes v. Horton, 518 P.2d 1380, affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 526 P.2d 304 (Colo. App. 1973) 
Reiser y. Lobner, Utah, 641 P.2d 93 C1982) 
Eich y, Cooper, 380 P.2d 613 (Qr. 1963) 
fil.il.L.Y.i._ Howell, Utah, 554 P.2d 1326 (1976) 
hlQt.e__y_.__.Jamifilul, 110 Ariz. 245, 517 P.2d 1241 (1974) 

















Tei:i:i ll. ZiQn.S CQ-Q2 lni>titute, . . . . 6 
Utah 605 P.2d 314 (1979) 
S'I'8'l'U'l'ES AN!2 QTHEE 8UTHQEI'l'IES 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-306, 1953 (as amended) 1, 12 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102, 1953 (as amended) 1, 9 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 45 . . . . . . 6 
-ii-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v- Case No. 19064 
GEORGE ALBERT ROYBAL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the trial court err in admitting the ruler and 
substitute knife into evidence? 
2. Did the evidence of defendant's intoxication negate 
the required intent for aggravated assault? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES. 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-306 (1953), as amended: 
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a 
defense to a criminal charge unless such 
intoxication negates the existence of the 
mental state which is an element of the 
offense • 
Utah Code Annotated§ 76-5-102 (1953), as amended: 
Assault is Cal An attempt, with 
unlawful force or violence to do bodily 
injury to another; or 
Cb) A threat, accompanied by a show of 
immediate force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant, George Albert Roybal, was charged by 
H1lormation with Aggravated Assault, a Felony of the Third Degree, 
ir, violation of § 76-5-103, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended. 
After a trial by jury on February 24, 1983, in the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, before the Honorable 
J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, presiding, the defendant was convicted 
of Aggravated Assault. On February 25, 1983, defendant was 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of zero to five years to be 
served at the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At approximately 1:00 a.m. on December 29, 1982 (T. 
191, Phillip Sebastian, a cab driver for Salt Lake Taxi Co. (T. 
161, was directed by two of his customers to go to the Bottoms Up 
Lounge (T. 171. They told him to wait for them (T. 191. About 
fifteen minutes later, when the bar closed at 1:00 a.m., they came 
out with four other men CT. 191. Two men sat in the front with 
Mr. Sebastian, while the others sat in the back (T. 191. 
Mr. Sebastian assumed they had been drinking (T. 48), 
but the two men in the front seat did not seem to be drunk CT. 
501 • One of the two men in the front was the defendant, George 
Albert Roybal, who sat next to Mr. Sebastian CT. 20, 211. 
After taking the original passenger home (T. 231, Mr. 
Sebastian took the remaining back seat passenger back to the 
Bottoms Up. He was travelling on Sixth West Street going south 
CT. 271. As they came to the intersection at Sixth West and Third 
North, Roybal, the defendant, pulled out a Buck knife with an 
approximately 5" blade CT. 27, 28). This knife was never 
recovered. The other man in the front seat also had a knife, and 
pulled it right after the defendant did (T. 36). 
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Mr. Sebastian stopped as he saw the knife being pulled 
wt. The defendant had turned his body a little to the left. He 
;sked Mr. Sebastian if he wanted to die, if he was ready to die. 
the' defendant acted very threatening (T. 31, 63). Mr. Sebastian 
told him, "Hey, don't do it. Take the car. Take all my money. 
Just don't cut me up." Sebastian held his hands up, palms forward 
'T. 33) and begged for his life (T. 64). 
The defendant held the knife 6"-10" away from Mr. 
Sebastian's chest and switched the knife around (T. 32, 56). Mr. 
Sebastian's hand was pricked sometime during the incident, but he 
was uncertain whether the knife caused the injury. Still, 
Sebastian had not come in contact with anything else which could 
have caused it (T. 56). 
Then the black man in the back started speaking. The 
defendant turned his head to listen. Mr. Sebastian took that 
opportunity to jump out (T. 33). He ran extremely fast up the 
stceet. He was afraid (T. 34). He ran up to a well-lighted house 
and pounded on the door CT. 34). A couple answered the door and 
let him in. j The woman telephoned the police (T. 35). Mr. 
Sebastian described the assailants to the dispatcher. He told him 
there were two guys with knives. 
Officer Bruce Jacobsen of the Salt Lake Police 
Depattment CT 65) arrived at the house (where Mr. Sebastian had 
f1ec1' 10-12 minutes later. The officer wanted Mr. Sebastian to 
'"' f two men he had apprehended a block away. One of these men 
defendant. In the officer's opinion, the defendant had 
"cen lltinking, but was not intoxicated (T. 79, 80). The 
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defendant's coordination was fairly good. His speech was not 
impaired, and he understood what the officer was telling him (T, 
101, 102). 
The officer drove Mr. Sebastian to the site where the 
two men were apprehended (T. 36, 72). The defendant was sitting 
in a police car CT. 62), and the black man was outside of it. Mr. 
Sebastian was 20'-30' from the defendant. He had excellent 
visibility. There were bright lights on inside the defendant's 
car CT. 39). 
Mr. Sebastian identified the defendant by pointing at 
him and saying, "That's the guy right there. You can haul him off 
and never let him out of jail" (T. 40). 
After the police got all the information they needed 
from Mr. Sebastian, Sebastian took the cab back to the garage. 
The police, however, called Sebastian five to ten minutes later 
and informed him they had picked up the other men who they 
believed pulled the second knife. Mr. Sebastian could not 
identify him CT. 44). 
At defendant's trial, the only major factual dispute 
concerned defendant's sobriety. Although both the arresting 
officer and Mr. Sebastian agreed that the defendant was not 
intoxicated CT. 50, 79, 60), defendant's companions testified that 
he was CT. 106, 119). Both of defendant's companions, however, 
were friends of his and had been convicted of several prior 
felonies CT. 103, 106, 111, 119, 124). 
The only evidence concerning defendant's intoxicated 
state came from Officer Phil Terry, who was the booking officer 
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IT. 145). He identified the defendant (T. 151) and said that he 
: h 0 ught that defendant was intoxicated. He said defendant was 
"ery boisterous, and was yelling at the officers. Mr. Terry 
,[1dlled defendant had a difficult time standing still and ran 
words together CT. 153). The officer explained, however, that he 
i<as booking others at the time CT. 157). 
The defendant also objected to the introduction into 
evidence of a substitute knife and a ruler CT. 12, 13, 45). The 
prosecution introduced these items for strictly demonstrative 
purposes (T. 12, 13). 
SUMMARY OF AEGUM£NTS 
The trial court correctly allowed into evidence the 
substitute knife and ruler. This demonstrative evidence was 
helpful to the jury in understanding the circumstances surrounding 
the assault. Even if the evidence should not have been admitted, 
no prejudice occurred. 
Defendant's argument that his intoxication negated the 
intent required for aggravated assault is without merit. 
Intoxication does not negate the general intent requirement of 
aggravated assault and there is no reason to exempt the facts of 
this case from that requirement. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE RULE AND 
SUBSTITUTE KNIFE INTO EVIDENCE. 
The victim testified that the defendant threatened him 
•,'1th a Buck knife having an approximately 5" blade (T. 29) • The 
kr.ife was not recovered after the assault. The State therefore 
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proffered a substitute knife and a ruler into evidence for 
demonstrative purposes only (T. 14, 45). 
Defendant contends, however, that admission of these 
items into evidence was prejudicial, and that the cumulative 
effect of such evidence to the jurors, if not the individual ones, 
warrants a new trial. Defendant cites Rule 45 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence in support of his contention, which provides the 
following balancing test: 
Except as in these rules otherwise 
provided, the Judge may in his 
discretion exclude evidence if he finds 
that its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the risk 
that its admission will ••• (bl create 
substantial danger of undue prejudice or 
of confusing the issues or of misleading 
a jury • 
Defendant correctly points out that there must be an abuse of 
discretion to reverse a trial court's admission of evidence. 
Martiny. Safewa:,r Stores. Inc., Utah, 565 P.2d 1139 (1977). 
There was not, and could not have been, an abuse of discretion in 
the instant case, however, since the use of the knife and the 
ruler as demonstrative evidence was in no way prejudicial. 
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has a tendency 
to influence the outcome of a trial by improper means, or if it 
appeals to the jury's sympathies, or arouses its sense of horror, 
provokes its instinct to punish, or otherwise causes the jury to 
base its decision on something other than established 
propositions of the case. Terry y, Zions Mercantile 
Institute, Utah, 605 P.2d 314 <1979). 
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Both the substitute Buck knife and a ruler did not 
, ; s<' to the level of prejudice previously described. The 
, ",dence of the knife and the length of the blade were central to 
t11>-· question of whether an aggravated assault occurred. The 
demonstrations regarding the length of the blade helped the jury 
co understand the seriousness of the threat involved, while the 
substitute knife was used by the victim to demonstrate how the 
defendant positioned the knife and its proximity to his chest. 
The jury drew the only logical and proper conclusion possible: 
that defendant was guilty of aggravated assault. 
Replicas of physical evidence are usually admitted 
where the original item has been lost or destroyed, although the 
admissibility of the evidence is of course within the discretion 
of the trial judge. Reaves y. Horton, 518 P.2d 1380, affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, 516 P.2d 304 (Colo. App. 1973). 
Duplicates of originals may be used when the nature and 
properties of an article itself require consideration by a jury, 
or where, as with models, the model tends to explain how an event 
may have occurred. Richy. Cooper, 380 P.2d 613 <Or. 1963). In 
the instant case, the duplicate knife and ruler were important in 
est a bl i shi ng how the assault took pl ace and the level of threat 
involved. They helped the jury to understand why that particular 
kind of knife, along with the verbal threats, made the assault 
serious, and why the victim plead for his life and jumped out of 
Lhe cab when the opportunity presented itself. 
Defendant maintains, however, that the jury would 
1°11eve that the substitute knife was actually the knife used in 
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the assault. Although there is a potential for misperceptions 
whenever substitute evidence is presented, these misperceptions 
did not exist in the instant case. The jury was fully aware that 
the knife was a substitute knife to be used for demonstrative 
purposes only and that the real knife was never recovered because 
of the length of time spent arguing about the length and width of 
the blade CT. 58, 59, 29, 30). If the real knife had been 
recovered, there would have been no need to have the ruler 
admitted into evidence. An example of a substitute weapon being 
admitted into evidence is found in Rich y. Cooper, In 
the plaintiff sued a police officer for assault and battery 
allegedly committed during the arrest. The plaintiff sought to 
have a "sap" similar to the one the defendant had used upon him 
admitted into evidence. The defendant objected to the 
admissibility of the substitute evidence on the ground that it 
was not the sap he used. The trial court sustained the 
objection. On appeal, the court held that the plaintiff would be 
entitled to have the sap admitted into evidence on re-trial, 
unless material differences between the exhibit and the original 
were shown to exist • 
.RiJ;.h demonstrates that admissibility of a duplicate 
weapon into evidence outweighs the potential problem that the 
jury would assume the duplicate to be the actual weapon • 
.RiJ;.h also demonstrates that substitute evidence is 
considered relevant, contrary to the defendant's assertion that 
it is irrelevant and advances no material fact. However, the 
evidentiary substitution's probative value, discussed above, is 
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that it demonstrates the kind of knife used in the assault, and 
the manner in which it was used. Such information is crucial in 
,ctabishing the elements of aggravated assault. Aggravated 
requires an assault (as defined in § 76-5-102, Utah Code 
Ann., 1953 (as amended)) plus the intentional causation of 
serious bodily injury or use of a deadly weapon. The kind of 
knife used and the length of the blade are important factors in 
determining whether the knife should be considered a deadly 
weapon pursuant to the statutory language. 
Appellant cites .M.i:u..ti.n, and Reiser y. Lohner, 
Utah, 641 P.2d 93 (1982) for the proposition that irrelevant 
evidence should not be admitted because it has no probative value 
and may create confusion. The State agrees with this principle, 
but maintains that it has no application here. The evidence was 
relevant, which makes it easy to differentiate the two cases 
cited above. 
In M.a..r.t.in, the trial court excluded evidence of 
weather conditions at an airport twenty miles away from the scene 
of the accident at issue on the basis that its probative value 
was slight. In the court excluded evidence which 
did not cause the injury at issue. 
Both of these cases discuss evidence that had no 
bearing on the issues and was thus properly excluded by the trial 
rourt. These fact situations are quite different from the 
instant case, where the evidence in question is critical to 
the elements of the charge and was properly admitted into 
evidence. 
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Defendant also claims that he was prejudiced when the 
jury was allowed to measure five inches on the ruler. He argues 
that the victim could not accurately describe the length of the 
blade. The victim, however, was quite certain of the length of 
the blade, and described it very precisely on several occasions. 
He first estimated the length of the blade to be about five 
inches long CT. 29), and then, using the ruler, narrowed the 
length down to 4 1/2" to 4 3/4" CT. 30). He stated once more 
that the blade was four to five inches long, and that it was well 
over four and under six inches CT. 59). 
It would be difficult for any witness to be much more 
exact than was Mr. Sebastian. The defendant was not prejudiced 
by the measuring procedure because the jury only received a 
visual demonstration of what the victim's testimony had revealed. 
The jury did not speculate needlessly regarding the length of the 
blade. No speculation was possible because the jury was told 
almost exactly how long the blade was. 
It is clear that neither the admission of the ruler 
nor the substitute knife was in error. This demonstrative 
evidence was important in assisting the jury's understanding of 
how the incident occurred. Defendant contends, however, that the 
admission of both pieces of evidence was error, and that even if 
the individual errors were not sufficient to warrant a new trial, 
the cumulative effect was. Defendant cites Gooden v. State, 617 
P.2d 248 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980) to support the proposition that 
numerous irregularities may justify reversal. In Gooden, 
prejudicial questions were repeatedly asked despite repeated 
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sostained objections. The problems were compounded with 
eiudicial closing comments made by the prosecution. 
The problem with defendant's contention, however, is 
,1,cit numerous errors did not occur in the instant case. The 
rule has therefore been inappropriately applied here. 
M0reover, any error that did occur was slight and would have not 
have changed the outcome of the case. Reversal will not result 
merely because there may have been error and reversal occurs only 
if the error is such that there was a reasonable likelihood that, 
in its absence, there would have been a result more favorable to 
the complaining party. Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 
1, Utah, 645 P.2d 608 (1982), In the instant case, the result 
would have been the same, even if the evidence had not been 
admitted. The evidence of the knife and the length of the blade 
would have been admitted in any case. 
The court properly admitted the ruler and the 
duplicate knife into evidence because it was helpful to the jury 
and was not prejudicial. Defendant's contentions are therefore 
without merit. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S INTOXICATION 
DID NOT NEGATE THE REQUIRED INTENT FOR 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT. 
Defendant claims to have been very intoxicated at the 
t1m" the incident took place. In support of this contention, 
rkfendant points out that the booking officer had made an entry 
or, the booking sheet describing him as very intoxicated (T. 106, 
l j 9) • 
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The overwhelming evidence, however, indicates that 
while defendant had been drinking, he was not intoxicated. The 
victim testified that defendant was not intoxicated. Officer 
Jacobsen likewise testified that he was not intoxicated CT. 79, 
80), and that the defendant's coordination was fairly good. The 
officer further stated that defendant's speech was not impaired, 
and that the understood what the officer was telling him (T. 101, 
102). 
Because the defendant was not intoxicated at all, his 
argument that intoxication negated the required intent is without 
merit. Even assuming, arguendo, that he was intoxicated, 
however, defendant still had the required intent when he pulled a 
knife on Mr. Sebastian. 
Section 76-2-306, Utah Code Ann., ( 1953), as amended 
provides that voluntary intoxication is a defense when "such 
intoxication negates the existence of the mental state which is 
an element of the offense." Where the charge is aggravated 
assault, caused by a deadly weapon or force likely to produce 
death or serious bodily injury, however, the intent required is 
merely a general intent. State y. Potter, Utah, 627 P.2d 75 
(1981); State y. Howell, Utah, 554 P.2d 1326 <1976). 
Intoxication does not negate general interest. In 
State y, Jamison, 110 Ariz. 245, 517 P.2d 1241 (1974), defendant 
was convicted of aggravated assault. On appeal, defendant 
contended that the crime of aggravated assault is a crime that 
requires specific as opposed to general intent. The court held: 
General criminal intent is implied 
from the act itself while specific 
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intent is not. In the instant case we 
believe that the crime of assault of a 
police officer is a crime of general 
intent • .l.d. at 1244. 
'! 'o court went on further to state: 
In general intent cases, once the 
commission of the crime has been shown 
th absence of general intent may be 
shown by the defendant, but this is the 
defendant's burden and voluntary 
intoxication will not negate general 
intent • .lJi._ at 1244. 
A similar result was reached by this court in State v. 
Jl.Q\i.cl.l, In .H..oW..ell, the court held that the section of 
the aggravated assault statute referring to the use of deadly 
weapons requires only a general intent. The court found this 
general intent to be met even though the defendant claimed 
he was too intoxicated to know what he was doing. 
In People y. Rocha, 92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372 
(1971), the defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly 
weapon and asserted as error that the crime of assault with a 
deadly weapon was a crime which required a specific intent. 
Therefore, his intoxication could be introduced to negate the 
element of intent. The court held that assault with a deadly 
weapon is a general intent crime. Therefore, intoxication 
could not negate such intent. The court stated: 
[Tlhe criminal intent which is 
required for assault with a deadly 
weapon ••• is the general intent to 
willfully commit an act the direct, 
natural and probably consequences of 
which if successfully completed would be 
the injury to another. Given that 
intent it is immaterial whether or not 
the defendant intended to violate the 
law or knew that his conduct was 
unlawful. The intent to cause any 
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particular injury ••. to severely 
injury another, or to injure in the 
sense of inflicting bodily harm, is not 
necessary." l..d.... at 376, 377. 
Defendant contends, however, that the facts of 
this case should require specific intent. He maintains that 
general intent should be required in cases where a deadly 
weapon is held by a defendant but never used to threaten the 
victim, as in Potter, He distinguishes his own 
situation by stressing that he intentionally used a weapon 
and caused fear in his victim, thus warranting specific 
intent. 
Appellant's contention, however, is groundless. 
This fact situation is comparable to that found in ll..mLelJ., 
In Howell, the defendant had the intent to 
use a deadly weapon and to cause fear in his victim. The 
Howell defendant, in fact, went further than the defendant in 
the instant case and actually caused severe bodily harm to 
his victim. This Court held nevertheless that only general 
intent applied. 
The general intent standard should remain for 
aggravated assault. As the court stated: 
!Ilt would be anomalous to allow 
evidence of intoxication to relieve a 
man of responsibility for the crimes of 
assault with deadly weapon or simple 
assault which are so frequently 
committed in just such a manner. l..d.... at 
374. 
When appellant states in his brief that he intentionally 
assaulted his victim, he should not be allowed to go free 





Based on the foregoing arguments, the judgment of 
below should be affirmed. 
' / .,.-? 
Respectfully submitted this · ,..,-day of January, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
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